The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has issued a stark warning: Afghanistan lacks the institutional capacity, security infrastructure, and economic stability to absorb returning refugees, especially those forcibly deported. According to a recent UN agency report, over 500,000 Afghan nationals have returned since 2021, primarily through spontaneous returns or third-country repatriation programs. However, the country’s economy has contracted by nearly 30% since the Taliban takeover, with over half the population facing acute food insecurity. The health and education systems are near collapse, and humanitarian aid remains insufficient to meet basic needs.
Forced returns compound these challenges. The UNHCR emphasizes that many returnees face immediate risks, including detention, violence, and lack of access to shelter or livelihoods. In urban centers like Kabul and Kandahar, informal settlements have expanded rapidly, straining already inadequate water, sanitation, and medical services. The report concludes that Afghanistan cannot be considered a safe country for return, raising serious legal and ethical concerns about ongoing deportation practices by European states.
EU Continues Deportations Despite Security Warnings
Despite these warnings, several EU member states—including Germany, Austria, and Denmark—have resumed or expanded efforts to deport rejected Afghan asylum seekers. In 2023 alone, over 8,000 deportation orders were issued to Afghan nationals across the bloc, with approximately 1,200 individuals physically removed. These actions often occur under bilateral readmission agreements or through charter flights coordinated with transit countries such as Pakistan or Iran.
Security assessments from the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) consistently classify much of Afghanistan as high-risk, particularly for vulnerable groups such as women, journalists, and former government employees. Nevertheless, some governments argue that certain regions, particularly major cities, are secure enough to justify returns. This position contradicts field reports from humanitarian organizations and creates legal vulnerabilities, as courts in multiple EU countries have suspended deportations due to human rights concerns.
Direct Fiscal Costs of Deportation Programs
The financial burden of forced deportations on EU budgets is substantial and often underestimated. Direct costs include detention center operations, legal processing, transportation logistics, and diplomatic coordination. On average, a single deportation costs between €25,000 and €50,000 when factoring in prolonged detention, legal appeals, and chartered flights. For context, detaining one individual for six months can cost up to €20,000, while a single charter flight carrying 50 deportees may exceed €300,000.
According to Eurostat data, EU member states collectively spent over €1.2 billion on return and reintegration programs in 2022, with an increasing share allocated to enforcement rather than voluntary return incentives. Germany alone reported €217 million in return-related expenditures, while France spent €189 million. These figures do not include indirect costs borne by local municipalities, such as emergency healthcare or social services for families affected by deportation proceedings.
Indirect Economic and Social Risks
Beyond direct expenditures, forced deportations pose significant indirect economic risks. First, they strain public trust in immigration systems, potentially fueling social unrest in communities hosting large refugee populations. In cities like Berlin and Brussels, advocacy groups have organized protests against deportation raids, citing racial profiling and violations of due process.
Second, reputational damage may affect international aid flows and diplomatic relations. Donor countries and multilateral institutions may hesitate to fund stabilization programs in Afghanistan if returns undermine humanitarian objectives. Additionally, EU credibility in promoting human rights could be compromised, potentially impacting trade negotiations and development partnerships. A 2023 European Parliament briefing noted that inconsistent return policies risk fragmenting the Common European Asylum System and weakening solidarity among member states.
Opportunity Cost: Integration vs. Enforcement
A critical but often overlooked dimension is opportunity cost. The same funds used for deportations could be redirected toward integration programs that yield long-term economic benefits. Research from the OECD shows that every euro invested in language training, vocational education, and labor market insertion generates up to €4 in economic returns over a decade through increased tax revenues and reduced welfare dependency.
For example, integrating 10,000 Afghan refugees into the workforce could contribute an estimated €200–300 million annually to GDP across the EU, based on median income levels and employment rates among resettled populations. In contrast, deporting the same number would cost upwards of €300 million—without generating any economic return. Furthermore, integration supports demographic resilience in aging EU economies, addressing labor shortages in healthcare, construction, and logistics sectors.
Regional Stabilization as a Strategic Alternative
An alternative approach involves investing in regional stabilization and legal pathways for migration. Strengthening border management, supporting host countries like Iran and Pakistan, and expanding humanitarian corridors could reduce irregular movements more effectively than punitive measures. The EU’s Trust Fund for Africa demonstrates that targeted development aid can reduce migration pressures; a similar model could apply to Central and South Asia.
Moreover, enhancing legal admission channels—such as work visas, family reunification, and academic exchanges—would decrease reliance on asylum systems while ensuring safer, regulated migration. Such strategies align with broader fiscal sustainability goals by reducing emergency response costs and fostering international cooperation.
